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Abstract
Main product  of  the  the  Digital  Age is  information  and  main  tool  of  this  Age is  an
information  system  (IS).  The  purpose  of  IS  is  accumulating,  storing,  multiplying  and
distributing information. To be sure that data and information will be stored and distributed as
secure as possible, it is necessary to pay attention to the security design of an IS from the very
early stages of the software developing process. Security modeling languages such as Misuse
cases  and Secure  Tropos  may help to  deal  with this  problem. These two languages  have
proven their usefulness to elicit, negotiate and visualize security requirements and contribute
to the thorough definition of the secure information systems. Although these languages are
serving for identical aim, they differ in many ways. Main difference are various viewpoints on
the modeled system,  i.e., Secure Tropos help to understand the security rationale,  Misuse
cases help to relate security and functionality together.
When designing secure software it is important to consider different viewpoints to the
problem. But the problem of using two or more languages is to translate different viewpoints
consistently.
This problem can be solved with automation of the transformation process between two
modeling languages. Despite Misuse cases and Secure Tropos have differences, they also have
similarities, allowing us to automate transformation process from one language to another and
vice versa.
The main goal of this thesis is to develop a prototype that would facility and support
transformation of the Misuse cases to Secure Tropos models and  vice versa. The prototype
would  allow developers  to  interchange  the  data  between  two  modeling  softwares,  where
models  of  two  languages  can  be  modeled  using  MagicDraw  UML  (Misuse  cases)  and
SecTro2 Tool (Secure Tropos).
To ensure that automated transformation process is efficient than manual transformation
process  we  have  conducted  some  practical  experiment.  It  showed  that  prototype  allows
developers  to  shorten  the  time  that  is  spent  on  transformation.  The  survey  showed  that
prototype is user friendly.
Keywords
Secure Tropos models, Misuse case diagrams, transformation, transformation rules, security
modeling  languages,  information  system  security,  MagicDraw  UML,  SecTro2,  plug-in,
prototype
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Secure Tropos mudelite ja Misuse Case diagrammide 
teisendamise prototüüp.
Lühikokkuvõtte
Peamiseks tooteks 21. sajandil on informatsioon, ja peamiseks vahendiks informatsiooni
vahetamises,  säilitamises  ja  kogumises  on  infosüsteemid.  Et  kindlustada  informatsiooni
turvalisust hoidmisel ja levitamisel on väga oluline pöörata oma tähelepanu infosüsteemide
turvalisusele juba selle arendamisprotsessi algstaadiumitel. Sellel juhul kasutavad arendajad
tihti modelleerimiskeeli, nagu Secure Tropos ja Misuse cases. Need kaks tõestasid oma võimet
tuua esile, visualiseerida ja analüüsida infosüsteemide turvanõudeid ja turvariske, panustades
infosüsteemide turvalisusele.  Kuigi need modelleerimiskeeled teenivad identsete eesmärkide
nimel, erinevad nad mitmeti. Peamiseks erinevuseks on erinevate vaatenurkade olemasolu –
nt. Secure Tropos mudelid  aitavad  mõista  turvalisuse  loogikat  ja  Miuse  case  diagrammid
seovad turvalisust ja funktsionaalsust kokku.
Infosüsteemi  turvalisuse  projekteerimisel  on  väga  oluline  kinni  pidada  paljudest
eesmärkidest,  vaadates  probleemile  kõikvõimalikest  vaatenurkadest  ja  kasutades
modeleerimisel  kohe  mitut  modelleerimiskeelt.  Selline  lähenemine  aitab  infosüsteemi
turvalisust  tunduvalt  tõsta,  kuid  nõuab  mudelitest  järjepidevat  uuendamist.  Sellel  juhul
peamiseks probleemiks on teisendamise järjekindluse säilitamine.
Selle probleemi lahenduseks võiks olla tööriist, mis saaks automatiseerida teisendamise
protsessi ühest modelleerimise keelest teisse ja vastupidi. Vaatamata  Misuse case ja  Secure
Tropos erinevustele, nendel kahel on ka sarnasusi, mis võimaldavad defineerida teisendamise
reegleid arvuti abil ja viia ellu teisendamise prototüübi.
Selle lõputöö eesmärgiks on arendada tööriista prototüüp, mis saaks teisendada  Secure
Tropos mudeli  Misuse case diagrammiks ning vastupidi. Prototüübi abiga saavad arendajad
jagada andmeid kahe modelleerimistööristade vahel,  kus  Secure Tropos mudelid (SecTro2
Tool) ja Misuse case diagrammid (MagicDraw UML) on projekteeritud.
Et  osutada  automatiseeritud  protsessi  paremust  mitteautomatiseeritud  protsessi  üle,  me
viime läbi küsitluse ja väikese praktilise katse. Praktiline katse saab tõestada, et teisendamine
prototüübiga  on  oluliselt  kiirem.  Küsitlus  aitab  näidata,  et  prototüüp  on  piisavalt
kasutajasõbralik  tavalise kasutaja jaoks.
Võtmesõnad
Secure  Tropos  mudelid,  Misuse  case  diagrammid,  teisendamine,  teisendamise  reeglid,
turvalisuse  modelleerimis  keeled,  infosüsteemide  turve,  MagicDraw  UML,  SecTro2,
lisamoodul, prototüüp
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The security modeling languages such as Secure Tropos [Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007]
and Misuse cases  [Sindre and Opdahl, 2005] can contribute to the security of IS from the
early stages of system development. Secure Tropos and Misuse cases are different and have
opposite viewpoints on the security definition. The Secure Tropos helps to define the security
mechanisms and  methods  that  are  contributing  to  satisfaction  of  the  security  constraints.
Misuse cases help to define security requirements of the IS. The usage of these two together
helps to express various security requirements and security mechanisms, allowing developers
to improve the overall security of the IS. The main problem of using these two modeling
languages  simultaneously is  the difficulty  to  develop and maintain the consistency of the
system model.
Although Secure Tropos and Misuse cases have differences, they also have similarities.
Both  languages  are  aligned  to  the  domain  model  of  Information  System  Security  Risk
Management (ISSRM) [Mayer, 2009]. The alignment clearly defines how modeling language
constructs  can  represent  the  constructs  of  ISSRM.  The  alignment  of  Secure  Tropos  and
Misuse cases helps to spot the similar patterns of both modeling languages, allowing to define
the transformation rules between models of Secure Tropos and Misuse case diagrams. The
automation of these transformation rules could solve the time consumption problem. This
work  raises  two  questions:  (i)  How  to  manage  security  risks  using  different  modeling
languages and to keep model consistency? and (ii) How to automate model transformation
between Secure Tropos and Misuse cases?
This thesis main goal is to develop a prototype that would facilitate and support automated
transformation of the Misuse cases to Secure Tropos models and  vice versa. The prototype
would  allow developers  to  interchange  the  data  between  two  modeling  softwares,  where
models of two languages can be modeled – MagicDraw UML (Misuse cases) and SecTro2
Tool (Secure Tropos). The main base of the prototype would be defined using the OpenAPI of
industrial  tool  MagicDraw UML, and would  be acting  as  a  plug-in tool.  To validate  the
prototype we will conduct the validation process. 
The  thesis  is  divided  to  seven  chapters  and  is  structured  as  follows.  First  chapter
introduces thesis overall purposes and main goals; explains thesis structure. Second, third and
fourth chapters are introducing the overall background of the work. Second chapter explains
the ISSRM domain model, its concepts and process. Third chapter introduces two modeling
languages – Secure Tropos and Misuse cases, discusses the language extensions, shows the
alignment  of  modeling  languages  with  ISSRM  and  announces  the  software  tools  for
modeling.  Fourth  chapter  discusses  and  explains  the  transformation  rules  between  two
languages. The fifth and sixth chapters contribute to explanation  of the developed prototype.
Fifth chapter gives details about implementation of the prototype, discusses it's design, code
structure and requirements. Chapter 6 introduces the validation process of the prototype. The
seventh chapter concludes the overall work.
This work also includes appendices: A, B, C, D are located at the end of the thesis; E, F,
G, H are located on the additional CD. Appendices A, B, C, D contain additional information
related to thesis: alignment tables, transformation rule examples, validation questionnaire and
examples  of  models  used  in  validation.  Appendices  E,  F,  G  respectively  contain  the
documentation for source code of the plug-in tool, plug-in source code,  compiled plug-in tool
and report generation templates.
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Chapter 2: ISSRM Domain Model
Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) domain model is set of security
methods, standards and frameworks, which combines several risk management concepts and
methodologies such as Risk Management and Security Risk Management. ISSRM domain
model helps to define, and handle security risks and threats within the design of the software
system during  security  engineering  process.  ISSRM is  made  specially  for  IS  developing
process [Mayer, 2009].
Concepts of the ISSRM domain model can be divided into three different categories as
shown below in the Figure 1: (i) asset-related (yellow), (ii) risk-related (orange), and (iii) risk
treatment-related concepts (green). Main six steps (see  Figure 2) of ISSRM process are: (i)
Context and Asset identification, (ii) Determination of Security Objectives, (iii) Risk Analysis
and Assessment, (iv) Risk Treatment, (v) Security Requirements Definition and (vi) Control
Selection and Implementation [Mayer, 2009][Soomro, 2012].
2.1. Asset-related concepts
Asset-related  concepts  represent  the  instances  that  have  to  be  protected  by  security
mechanisms, in other words – assets are all valuable and essential entities of organization that
have to be protected [Dubois et al., 2010]:
• Asset – the object or resource that is used by the company in order to achieve certain
goals  in  their  business  activities  (e.g.,  technology, currency).  Can be structured to
IS-assets and business assets;
• Business  asset  –  the  process  or  resource  of  the  company  that  can  perform
informational manipulations in order to achieve business goals of organization (e.g.,
information technology, employee skills);
• IS-asset – the supporting object, component, property or resource of IS, that is used by
business asset to process information in certain way (e.g., database, computer);
• Security criterion – criteria or property of business asset, that is defined to constraint
business  assets  in  order  to  achieve  security  goals  of  the  IS,  such  as  integrity  or
confidentiality;
2.2. Risk-related concepts
Risk-related concepts represent the instances that potentially can damage, threat or harm
the assets of IS [Dubois et al., 2010]:
• Risk  – is  a  combination  of  one  event and  one  or  more  impacts;  represents  the
theoretical possibility of harming and damaging assets;
• Impact – the negative consequences of the risk, predicts what damage can be done to
assets of the IS (e.g., data loss, loss of confidentiality);
• Threat – a plan or intention of threat agent to inflict damage to assets;
• Vulnerability – the flaw, weakness or shortage of  asset, can be used by attacker to
produce threat.  Vulnerability can be attacked, exploited or used by threat agent with
intentions to harm asset;
• Event –  set of actions, that consists of the threat and vulnerability or  vulnerabilities.
Event leads to impact;
• Threat agent – person with intentions to damage the assets of IS. Uses attack methods
to exploit vulnerabilities of the IS. Threat agent is producing threats;
• Attack method – method that can be used by threat agent in order to achieve agent's
goals, exploiting vulnerabilities;
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2.3. Risk treatment-related concepts
Risk treatment-related concepts represent the actions and methods that  help to protect
assets from being harmed and damaged by risk-related concepts [Dubois et al., 2010]:
• Risk  treatment – manipulations  or  countermeasures,  that  contribute  in  reducing or
avoiding the risk;
• Security requirement – the proposed improvement to mitigate one ore many risks;
• Control – the active countermeasure to prevent threats (e.g., firewall);
2.4. ISSRM Process
ISSRM process is a model based engineering process, which consists of the six steps. The
process is iterative and it may be repeated until reaching the satisfying level of security (see
Figure 2) [Matulevičius et al., 2012][Mayer, 2009]:
1. Context  and  Asset  Identification:  The  main goal  of  the  first  step  is  to  define
organization  context  and  identify  assets of  the  company,  focusing  on  sensitive
activities related to informational security. First of all are defined business assets and
afterwards can be identified IS assets;
2. Determination of Security Objectives:  Relying on the previous step, organization
determines  it's  security  objectives  and  properties  of  the  assets.  Usually  security
objectives can be described as integrity, confidentiality and availability.
3. Risk Analysis  and Assessment:  During this  step organization  identifies  risks  and
performs the risk estimation analysis. If found risks are evaluated against estimated
security objectives then process can proceed to the next step, otherwise process needs
to start over from the first step;
4. Risk Treatment:  This step can be performed using four different strategies: (i) risk
avoidance – no decision is made, avoiding involvement in any risk situation; (ii) risk
reduction  –  perform  actions  in  order  to  reduce  the  probability  of  negative
consequences made by risk impact; (iii) risk retention – the negative consequences of
the risk impact are not serious, hence no actions to mitigate risk are taken; (iv) risk
transfer  –  the  actions  reducing  the  risk  probability  are  shared  between  several
mechanisms or passed to other party;
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Figure 1: The ISSRM domain model (adapted from [Dubois et al., 2010])
5. Security Requirements Definition: The actions in this  step depend on previously
chosen risk treatment strategy. Risk reduction assumes defining security requirements
that will mitigate security risks. Security requirements for risk transformation strategy
may be fulfilled by third party. After security requirements are defined, they need to be
verified against security they provide. If proposed security requirements are satisfying
security needs - process can proceed to the next step; otherwise either risk treatment
step needs to be repeated, either all previous steps from the beginning; 
6. Control  Selection  and  Implementation: In  this  step  security  of  the  system  is
improved  by  implementation,  countermeasures  and  definition  of  the  appropriate
security policies;
2.5. Summary
ISSRM domain model is a set of security methods, standards and frameworks. ISSRM
domain model helps to define security risks, security requirements and security mechanisms
during IS security engineering process. The concepts of ISSRM domain model are divided in
three categories: (i) asset-related concepts, (ii) risk-related concepts and (iii) risk-treatment
concepts. ISSRM process is a model based engineering process, which consists of the six
steps.
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Figure 2: ISSRM process (adapted from [Mayer, 2009])
Chapter 3: Security Modeling Languages
This chapter introduces two security modeling languages – Secure Tropos and Misuse
cases  (MUC);  discusses  their  theoretical  background,  modeling  rules,  software  tools  and
provides examples of designed models and diagrams.
3.1. Security Modeling Language
The modeling language is artificial language applied in requirement modeling stages of
the software developing process. As the ordinary languages, modeling languages have their
own syntax,  rules,  meanings and semantics.  Main purposes of modeling language are:  (i)
specify and show the future behavior  of  the software  under  development;  (ii)  define and
represent the abstract and concrete objects or events related to software and it's behavioral
processes. The activity of using modeling language is called modeling.
The security modeling language is particularistic type of the modeling language, which
aims  on  the  understanding,  analyzing,  modeling  and  handling  the  security  risks  of  the
software  system  under  development.  Security  modeling  languages  (e.g.,  Secure  Tropos,
Misuse  cases,  KAOS  extension  to  Security  [Mayer,  2009],  BPMN  [Silver,  2009],
Mal-activities [Sindre, 2007], Secure UML [Lodderstedt et al., 2002]) are mainly used during
the security engineering stage of the software development process, helping to model security
risks, security mechanisms and security requirements of software system.  To meet security
standards  security  modeling  languages  are  aligned  with  particular  Risk  Management  and
Security Risk Management methodologies (e.g., ISSRM).
3.1. Misuse Cases
Misuse cases (MUC) is a security modeling language, extended from Use case models by
[Sindre and Opdahl, 2005]. Authors of the MUC found that use cases by it selves are very
suitable  at  the  defining  functional  requirements,  but  do  not  allow  developers  to  specify
security-related problems, moreover developers had to use different modeling languages to
explain security requirements; therefore were proposed additions to Use case models [Sindre
and Opdahl, 2005]. 
The main idea of Misuse case models is the opposite concept of Use cases, where the
unwanted activity can be defined using negative entities of an actor and use case – misuser
and  misuse  case.  To allow  developers  to  specify  countermeasures  against  the  unwanted
activity  were  proposed  additional  entities:  security  use  case, and  additional  relationships
mitigates and threatens [Sindre and Opdahl, 2005].
The further  studies  in  the same field  [Matulevičius et  al.,  2012][Soomro and Ahmed,
2013] have shown that MUC is very useful at modeling security risks, but the countermeasure
modeling  step  has  a  serious  lack  in  the  constructs,  leading  to  “misinterpretation  of  the
security-related  concepts”  and “poor  security  solutions”.  According  to  these  studies  were
proposed  several  additional  constructs,  transforming  MUC to  extended  MUC –  Security
risk-oriented Misuse cases (SROMUC); also was made the alignment of SROMUC to ISSRM
[Soomro and Ahmed, 2013].
3.1.1. Misuse Cases in Terms of ISSRM
The alignment of SROMUC was made by [Soomro and Ahmed, 2013]. In this part we
show  how  SROMUC  constructs  are  aligned  with  ISSRM  concepts  in  three  stages:  (i)
asset-related concepts; (ii) risk-related concepts; (iii) risk treatment-related concepts.
Asset-related concepts (see Appendix A: Alignment Tables, Table 4) in SROMUC can be
represented combining such constructs as actor, use case, security constraint; and using such
relationships as  communication link (association), includes,  extends and  constraints of. The
supports relationship of ISSRM between IS-assets  and business assets  can be represented
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using  such  relationships  as  include,  extend and  communication (association)  link  of
SROMUC.
Risk-related  concepts  of  ISSRM  in  SROMUC  can  be  modeled  by  combining  such
constructs as misuser, misuse case, impact, use case and vulnerability; and linking constructs
with such relationships as communication link, exploits, negates, harms, leads to, includes and
extends. Examples of SROMUC risk-related syntax constructs can be seen in  Appendix A:
Alignment Tables, Table 5.
Risk treatment-related concepts of ISSRM constructs can be represented using  security
use  case and  mitigates relationship.  Examples  of  SROMUC risk  treatment-related  syntax
constructs can be seen in  Appendix A: Alignment Tables,  Table 6. The risk treatment and
control components of ISSRM can not be modeled using SROMUC.
3.1.2. MagicDraw UML
To model Misuse case diagrams we have chosen Magic Draw UML software. MagicDraw
UML is software modeling tool made by NoMagic Inc., it allows to create several types of
UML diagrams, including Use case diagrams.
MagicDraw UML has own OpenAPI and JavaDoc materials,  allowing users to extend
current functionality by producing additional software – plug-ins. The NoMagic company in
the interest of the thesis gave us free academical version of the software, which allows us to
produce non-commercial plug-ins in academical interests.
MagicDraw UML has simple and user-friendly interface (shown in  Figure 3), the main
working areas are: (i) containment area – here are shown all elements used in project in the
tree view; (ii) diagram mini-map – used for navigating through modeling spaces; (iii) tool-bar
area – here are listed all modeling tools; (iv) modeling area – main area, where models are
drawn with modeling tools.
The software does not allow to directly model Misuse case diagrams, but it  has wide
visual and program customization tools, allowing to represent different constructs of Use case
models  as  constructs  of  Misuse  case  models  (e.g.,  color  filler  and  applied  stereotype
functionality). While color filler is clearly visual representation tool – it allows to fill elements
with different colors (e.g., filling actor with black color visually transforms it to misuser), the
13
Figure 3: MagicDraw UML user interface
applied stereotype functionality can be both: visual and program (e.g,  applying “exploits”
stereotype to  include relationship transforms it to  exploits relationship: visually – instead of
“include”  sign  now  is  “exploits”  sign;  and  programmatically  –  software  sees  applied
stereotype “exploits” to include relationship).
Examples  of  modeled Misuse  case constructs  using  MagicDraw UML can be  seen in
Appendix A: Alignment Tables in  Table 4,  Table 5 and Table 6. The full documentation for
MagicDraw UML can be found at official NoMagic Inc. web-page [Documentation].
3.2. Secure Tropos
Secure Tropos is  security oriented development methodology, which is  extended from
Tropos methodology and i* framework by [Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007]. It has inherited
many elements from Tropos methodology such as  actor,  goal,  plan,  softgoal and  resource,
adding security-oriented elements such as  security constraint and  threat.  Secure Tropos is
mostly used at  early stages of requirement  analysis  [Mouratidis  and Giorgini,  2007].  The
further  studies  [Matulevičius et  al.,  2012]  have  extended  Secure  Tropos  and  aligned  it's
constructs with ISSRM.
Secure Tropos is agent-oriented security modeling language, thus the main idea consists in
relations between two ore more actors [Matulevičius et al., 2012][Mouratidis and Giorgini,
2007].  In  Secure  Tropos  one  actor (depender)  can  depend  on  another  actor  (dependee)
through dependency relationship and one of the components (goal, resource, softgoal, plan).
In this case component between two actors is called dependum. Actor  can have own goals,
plans, softgoals and use resources in order to complete his goals or plans. The plan construct
can be decomposed to smaller parts (goals, plans, resources).
3.2.1. Secure Tropos in Terms of ISSRM
In this part we show how Secure Tropos constructs are aligned with ISSRM concepts in
three stages: (i) asset-related concepts, (ii) risk-related concepts and (iii) risk treatment-related
concepts.
Asset-related concepts of ISSRM in Secure Tropos can be modeled using components:
actor,  goal,  resource,  plan,  softgoal,  security  constraint; and  relationships:  means-end,
decomposition, contribution, satisfies, restricts and dependency. As can be seen in Appendix
A: Alignment Tables, Table 7, supports relationship of ISSRM can be modeled using several
relationships of Secure Tropos. The constraint of relationship of ISSRM in Secure Tropos is
modeled in two ways: implicit and explicit. In implicit relationship dependum of dependency
relationship is constrained by  security constraint, showing that constraint is also applied to
depender and/or dependee. Explicit relationship is represented by  restricts relationship and
shows that construct (goal, plan, resource) is restricted by security constraint [Matulevičius et
al., 2012].
Risk-related concepts of ISSRM in Secure Tropos can be modeled using constructs: actor,
threat,  goal,  plan,  vulnerability;  and  relationships:  means-end,  decomposition,  impacts,
attacks and exploits. Relationships provokes and significance assessed by of ISSRM can not
be  modeled  using  Secure  Tropos.  The  alignment  of  Secure  Tropos  constructs  to  ISSRM
risk-related concepts can be seen in Appendix A: Alignment Tables, Table 8.
Risk-treatment  concepts  of  ISSRM  can  be  represented  using  same  components  and
relationships as were used in modeling asset-related concepts, adding one new relationship –
mitigates.  Mitigates relationship  can  be  used  by  security  constraint against  risk.  Risk
treatment construct and relationships  intention to threat and  refines of  ISSRM can not be
modeled using Secure Tropos [Matulevičius et al., 2012]. To see how risk-treatment concepts
are  modeled  using  Secure  Tropos  construct  please  check  Appendix  A:  Alignment  Tables,
Table 9.
3.2.2. SecTro2
To model Secure Tropos  models we have chosen SecTro2 tool software.  SecTro2 is a
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software tool  made by authors  of Secure Tropos methodology [Mouratidis  and Giorgini,
2007]. Software tool allows to design and build security oriented models using Tropos and
Secure Tropos concept models. SecTro2 is fully free and is available for download at official
page of Secure Tropos project after short registration [Secure Tropos].
SecTro2 tool allows to model multilevel Secure Tropos models, using up to five different
model views (e.g., Security Requirements View, Security Attacks View, Organizational View).
We are interested in modeling only in two views : (i) Security Requirements View – main
view, where are mostly modeled asset-related concepts and risk-treatment concepts of Secure
Tropos;  (ii)  Security  Attacks  View  –  sub-view  for  threat  elements,  where  are  modeled
risk-related concepts of Secure Tropos;
The SecTro2 tool user interface main parts are (Figure 4): (i) model explorer – here are
listed all models; (ii) model navigator – mini-map for navigating through model area; (iii)
modeling tool-bar – here are listed all tools that are used to model Secure Tropos models; (iv)
modeling area – main area, where are models modeled; (v) views – bar with views switchers.
Examples of how Secure Tropos constructs are modeled using SecTro2 tool can be seen in
Appendix A:  Alignment  Tables in  Table  7,  Table 8 and  Table 9.  The full  user  guide for
SecTro2 tool can be found at official developers web-page [Secure Tropos].
3.3. Summary
The security modeling language is particularistic type of the modeling language, which
aims on the modeling and analyzing the security risks of the software system.
Misuse cases is a security modeling language, extended from Use case models. The main
idea of Misuse case models is to  model the unwanted activity in the software system and
propose  the  security  requirements  and  countermeasures.  Misuse  cases  extended  version
SROMUC is aligned to all ISSRM domain model concepts in [Soomro and Ahmed, 2013].
Misuse cases can be modeled with MagicDraw UML software.
Secure Tropos is a security modeling language, extended from i* framework and Tropos
methodologies and is mostly used at early stages of requirement analysis. The main idea of
Secure Tropos consists in relations between two ore more actors. Secure Tropos is aligned to
ISSRM domain model in [Matulevičius et al., 2012]. To model Secure Tropos constructs we
are using SecTro2 tool.
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Figure 4: SecTro2 tool user interface 
Chapter 4: Transformation
This chapter introduces a set of transformation rules used in prototype for translating from
Misuse case diagrams to Secure Tropos models and  vice versa. All rules are based on the
ISSRM domain model and transformation rules defined in [Ahmed and Matulevičius, 2011]
[Soomro, 2012][Ahmed et al., 2012].
4.1. Software Limitations
It is important to understand that software tools, that were used to model and transform
between two modeling languages, had limitations in modeling. Limitations are affecting input
and output models of prototype, forcing us to make minor changes in transformation rules.
The proposed set is made prior to these limitations and may slightly differ from canonical
rules.  The  alignment  tables  of  both  security  modeling  languages  in  the  Appendix  A:
Alignment Tables are showing how different ISSRM constructs can be modeled using two
software tools (MagicDraw UML and SecTro2).
4.2. Transformation Rule Types
Not all transformation rules can be automatically applied by prototype due the software
limitations or semantic and syntactic differences between Misuse case diagrams and Secure
Tropos models. Transformation rules will be divided by user involvement in transformation
process to three types:
1. Automatic – transformation rule will be applied by prototype automatically. Prototype
is using only elements of diagram to transform between two languages;
2. Semi-automatic –  prototype  needs  user  defined  inputs  in  order  to  apply
transformation  rule.  Prototype  is  using  elements  of  diagram  and  user  inputs  to
transform between two languages;
3. Manual – transformation rule will be not applied by prototype. User needs to apply
transformation rules manually after transformation is made by prototype;
4.3. Secure Tropos to Misuse Cases Transformation
This  part  introduces  step-by-step rules  applied by prototype to  transform from Secure
Tropos models to Misuse case diagrams. Transformation rules are based on three concepts: (i)
alignment  of  SROMUC to  ISSRM made by [Soomro and Ahmed,  2013];  (ii)  previously
defined  and  proposed rules  by  [Ahmed  and  Matulevičius,  2011]  for  transformation  from
Secure Tropos to MUC; and (iii)  the considered software limitations of SecTro2 tool and
MagicDraw UML software (see 4.1). The following transformation rules are illustrated only
with finished result of Misuse case diagram, which may be confusing, to see how models
changed every step please see Appendix B: Transformation Rules Examples.
4.3.1. Model Example
In order to have full understanding of how transformation rules are applied by prototype
we will use the slightly changed Secure Tropos model example adapted from [Matulevičius et
al., 2012]. Model example was modeled using SecTro2 tool (see Figure 5, Figure 6).
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Figure 6: eSap model example "Authentication attack" threat sub-view
Figure 5: eSap model example modeled with SecTro2 tool, Security Requirements view
As can be seen in Figure 6, the model has three main actors cooperating with each other:
(i) “eSap” – is IS, designed to store and exchange sensitive patient's information between two
other  actors  –  patients  and  social  workers;  (ii)  “Patient” –  is  actor,  whom  sensitive
information is/can be stored in “eSap” database, thus “eSap” is depending upon the patient in
providing this information; (iii) “Social worker” – person who has access to “eSap” and can
view stored information and manage patient's care plan only after the consent is provided by
patient, thus social worker depends  through secure dependency on the  “eSap” in providing
the sensitive information about patient.
In order to keep sensitive information private “eSap” allows to use and view information
only if: (a) social worker is authenticated in system; and (b) consent to share information is
obtained. However there exists a threatening risk “Authentication attack” with impact on one
of the main system's goals(assets) “System privacy ensured”. The threat lies in vulnerability
of the system's  plan “Perform authorization checks” (see  Figure 5). The  attacker may just
repeatedly check the access to “eSap”  and if the actor “Social Worker” didn't log off of the
system, attacker may gain access to patient's sensitive information. In order to mitigate this
risk, the security constraint “Session closes in 15 minutes” is designed and proposed. If there
was no activity in last 15 minutes from logged user account the system will automatically
close the connection between “eSap” and user.
4.3.2. Transforming Asset-related Concepts
Asset-related concepts will be transformed following this set of the rules:
STMC1. A software system actor with internal boundaries in Secure Tropos is translated
to a software system boundary in SROMUC diagrams. This rule is automatic.
The software system actor “eSap” is translated to a software system boundary (Figure 7).
STMC2. Secure Tropos actors are transformed to actors in SROMUC. This rule will be
applied automatically.
Secure Tropos actors  “Patient” and  “Social Worker” are translated to SROMUC actors
(Figure 7).
STMC3.  Secure Tropos goals and plans are translated as use cases in SROMUC, the
relationships between them – means-end and decomposition – are transformed to include
relationship of SROMUC diagrams. This rule is automatic.
All goals and plans from Security Requirements view have been translated as use cases.
Relationships  means-end and  decomposition were  transformed  to  include relationships
(Figure 7).
STMC4. The dependency link between actors and software system actor in Secure Tropos
is translated as communication (association) link connecting actor and associated use case.
This rule will be applied automatically.
Dependency relationships  between  system  actor “eSap” and  actors “Patient” and
“Social Worker”  were transformed to  communication(association) links,  connecting  actors
and associated use cases (Figure 7).
STMC5. Security  constraint  and restricts  relationship of  Secure Tropos,  that  restricts
dependency relationship between software system actor and actor are transformed to security
criterion and constraints of relationship in SROMUC diagrams. This rule is automatic.
Security  constraint  “Share  info  only  if  consent  obtained”  was  translated  as  security
criterion, restricts relationship was transformed to constraints of relationship (Figure 7).
4.3.3. Transforming Risk-related Concepts
Risk-related concepts will be transformed following this set of the rules:
STMC6.  The  actor  of  Secure Tropos  who  attacks  and  exploits  the  vulnerabilities  of
system IS-assets (goals or plans) is translated to misuser of SROMUC. This rule is automatic.
The actor from model threat sub-view “Attacker” was transformed to SROMUC misuser
(Figure 7).
STMC7. The goals, plans or attack methods, that belong to actor that exploits or attacks
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vulnerabilities  of  system  IS-assets  in  Secure  Tropos  are  transformed  to  misuse  cases  in
SROMUC.  The  means-end  and  decomposition  relationships  of  Secure  Tropos  will  be
translated to includes relationship. The top element of threat tree construct will be connected
via communication link with misuser. This rule will be applied automatically.
Threat “Authentication attack” sub-view goals “Info about patient received”, “Consent
data  obtained”;  plans  “Collect  info  about  breaking the  system”,  “Steal  data”  and  “Buy
data”;  attack method “Check access eSap repeatedly”  were transformed to  misuse cases.
Means-end and  decomposition relationships between  goals,  plans and  attack method were
translated  as  include relationships.  The  communication(association)  link was  added,
connecting misuser “Attacker” and misuse case “Info about patient received” (Figure 7).
STMC8.  A Secure Tropos  vulnerability  transforms  to  SROMUC vulnerability, Secure
Tropos  attacks  relationship  connecting  attack  method  and  vulnerability  is  translated  as
exploits  relationship  in  SROMUC, moreover  the  additional  connection  threatens  is  made
between misuse case representing attack method and use case representing goal or plan with
inclusion of attacked vulnerability. This rule is automatic.
Vulnerability “User didn't log off”  was translated to  vulnerability  in SROMUC. Attacks
relationship from attack method “Check access eSap repeatedly” towards vulnerability “User
didn't  log  off” was  transformed  to  exploits relationship.  Additional  relationship  threatens
between misuse case “Check access eSap repeatedly” and use case “Perform authorization
checks” was added (Figure 7).
STMC9.  The impacts  relationship of Secure Tropos will  be transformed to SROMUC
diagram construct which will consist of minimum three elements: (i) leads to relationship –
relationship  between  misuse  case  representing  attack  method  and  impact  construct  of
SROMUC;  (ii)  impact  construct;  (iii)  harms  relationship  pointing  from impact  construct
towards  the  impacted  use  case  representing  goal  or  plan.  This  rule  will  be  applied
automatically. The negates relationship between impact construct and security criterion of
SROMUC needs to be modeled manually by user.
Impacts  relationship was translated to SROMUC construct containing two relationships:
(i) leads to: (ii) harms; and one element impact “Impact1” (Figure 7).
4.3.4. Transforming Risk Treatment-related Concepts
Risk treatment-related concepts will be transformed following this set of the rules:
STMC10.  The security constraint with mitigating relationship towards threat in Secure
Tropos will be translated as security use case of SROMUC. This rule is automatic.
Security constraint “Session closes in 15 minutes”  was translated to security use case
(Figure 7).
STMC11.  The  mitigates  relationship  of  Secure  Tropos  is  transformed  as  mitigates
relationship in SROMUC. This rule will be applied automatically.
Mitigates  relationship between security  constraint “Session closes in 15 minutes”  and
threat “Authentication attack” was translated to mitigates relationship (Figure 7).
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4.3.5. Finalizing Transformation
Not all elements and relationships can be translated automatically and in order to finalize
transformation from Secure Tropos models to Misuse cases diagrams user has to:
1. Rename  impact elements.  Although  impact elements  are  created  automatically  by
prototype, they will be named as “Impact1”, “Impact2”, …, “ImpactN”; where N is
amount of threats with impact relationship in Secure Tropos models;
2. Add  negates relationship, if it is needed.  Negates relationship can be used between
impact  and  security criterion in SROMUC. In Secure Tropos  negates relationship is
represented as impacts relationship. In SecTro2 tool it is impossible to connect threat
element and goal or plan elements with impacts relationship;
4.4. Misuse Cases to Secure Tropos Transformation
This section introduces step-by-step rules applied by prototype to transform from Misuse
case diagrams to Secure Tropos models. Transformation rules are based on three concepts: (i)
alignment  of  SROMUC to  ISSRM made by [Soomro and Ahmed,  2013];  (ii)  previously
defined and proposed rules by [Soomro, 2012][Ahmed et al., 2012] for transformation from
MUC  and  SROMUC  to  Secure  Tropos;  and  (iii)  the  considered  software  limitations  of
SecTro2 tool and MagicDraw UML software (see 4.1). Here we only provide the  figures for
finished result of Secure Tropos models, which may be confusing, to see how models changed
every step please see Appendix B: Transformation Rules Examples.
4.4.1. Diagram Example
To have full  understanding  how transformation  rules  are  applied  by  prototype  during
transformation from Misuse case diagram to Secure Tropos model we will  use previously
defined Misuse case model (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Misuse case result diagram (STMC10 and STMC11 rule example)
Transformation from Secure Tropos model to Misuse case diagram have not changed the
main ideas of diagram: (i) diagram has one system (“eSap”), represented as system boundary;
(ii) diagram has two main actors (“Patient”, ”Social Worker”) interacting with “eSap” ; and
(iii) within diagram is defined security risk;
The transformation process from Misuse cases diagrams to Secure Tropos models includes
several semi-automatic transformation rules, to apply these rules prototype waits from user
specific interaction. In this part we will not discuss the interaction methods with software,
here we only provide the transformation rules and its examples.
4.4.2. Transforming Asset-related Concepts
Asset-related concepts will be transformed following this set of the rules:
MCST1. A system boundary that represents software system in the Misuse case diagram
is  translated  to  Secure  Tropos  system  actor  with  internal  goal  diagram.  This  rule  is
automatic.
The system boundary “eSap” is transformed to system actor (Figure 9).
MCST2.  A use case from Misuse case diagram is translated either to goal or plan in
Secure Tropos model. Includes link is translated either to means-end relationship (goal at the
end of the relationship) or to decomposition relationship (plan at the end of the relationship).
This rule is semi-automatic; user needs to mark use cases that will be transformed to goals
and unmarked use cases will be translated to plans.
Use cases “Care Information collected”,  “System privacy ensured” and  “Consent has
been obtained” were translated to  goals, other  use cases were translated to  plans.  Include
relationships between use cases were transformed either to decomposition relations either to
means-end relationships (Figure 9).
MCST3.  An actor from the Misuse case diagram is translated to Secure Tropos actor.
This rule is automatic.
Actors “Patient” and “Social Worker” were transformed to Secure Tropos actors (Figure
9).
MCST4.  The security criterion from Misuse case diagrams is  transformed to security
constraint in Secure Tropos models. “Constraints of” relationship is translated as restricts
relationship. This rule is  semi-automatic; user defines security criterion and constraints of
relationship.
Security  criterion  “Share  info  only  if  consent  obtained” is  translated  to  security
constraint. Relationship constraints of was transformed to restricts relation (Figure 9).
MCST5. Association relationships and associated with them elements from Misuse case
diagram will be translated following these rules:
(i) If the system actor is dependee, then association relationship will  be translated as
dependency link in Secure Tropos and use case with which actor is associated to will  be
translated as dependum (goal either plan) in dependency relationship of Secure Tropos. This
rule is semi-automatic; user must identify all actors that will depend upon system actor;
(ii) If the system actor is depender in association relationship, then system actor, actor
and associated use case must be translated correspondingly. This rule is manual;
(iii)  If  associated use case has “constraints of” relationship with another use case in
Misuse case diagram, then use case at the end of the “constraints of” relationship will be
included in dependency relationship, acting as security constraint of Security Tropos between
system actor and dependum of dependency link (explicit restriction dependency). This rule is
semi-automatic; user must define “constraints of” relationship between two use cases and
identify security constraints.
As  actor  “Social  Worker” was  marked  as  depender  in  dependency relationship  with
“eSap” system,  his  communication  (association)  link with  use  case  “Care  information
collected” was transformed to  dependency relationship. The security constraint “Share info
only  if  consent  obtained” was  included  into  dependency  relationship,  defining  explicit
restriction  dependency relationship between  “eSap” and  “Social Worker”. Actor  “Patient”
was not marked as depender, thus his communication link with use case “Info provided” was
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not transformed to dependency relationship automatically (Figure 9).
4.4.3. Transforming Risk-related Concepts
Risk-related concepts will be transformed following this set of the rules:
MCST6.  For each threatens relationship of SROMUC is created one threat element in
Secure Tropos. This rule is automatic. All following rules will be applied in threat sub-view
(MCST7, MCST8, MCST9).
Misuse case diagram had one  threatens relationship, thus only one  threat element was
created - “Threat-1001” (Figure 9).
MCST7. A misuser will be translated to Secure Tropos actor. This rule is semi-automatic;
user needs to mark actors as misusers.
Misuser  “Attacker”  was  transformed  to actor  and  placed  into threat  “Threat-1001”
sub-view (Figure 8).
MCST8. A misuse case is translated accordingly to rule MCST2 either to goal or plan of
Secure Tropos. The misuse case with threatens relationship is transformed to attack method.
Include link is translated either to means-end relationship or decomposition relationship. This
rule is semi-automatic; user marks use cases as misuse cases.
Marked  as  goals misuse  cases “Info  about  patient  received” and  “Consent  data
obtained” were transformed to  goals,  other  misuse cases were transformed as  plans.  The
misuse case “Check access eSap repeatedly” was transformed to  attack method (Figure 8).
Relationships  include between  misuse cases were translated either to  means-end relations,
either to decomposition relationships.
MCST9.  A vulnerability of Misuse case is translated to vulnerability of Secure Tropos,
exploits link is translated to attacks relationship. This rule is  semi-automatic; user defines
vulnerability and exploits link.
Vulnerability “User didn't log off” was transformed to vulnerability and placed to threat
“Threat-1001” sub-view under “eSap” boundaries,  alongside  with  new  vulnerability  was
placed plan “Perform authorization checks”  because vulnerability  is  a  flaw of  this plan.
Exploits link between misuse case “Check access eSap repeatedly” and vulnerability “User
didn't log off” was translated as attacks relationship (Figure 8).
MCST10. A construct of three elements: (i) leads to relationship, (ii) harms relationship
and (iii) impact element - is translated to Secure Tropos impacts relationship. This rule is
22
Figure 8: Secure Tropos result model (Threat “Threat-1001” sub-view)  (MCST9 rule example)
semi-automatic; user defines leads to and harms relationships, defines impact element.
The “Impact1” impact element and its relationships leads to and harms were transformed
to impacts relationship pointing from threat “Threat-1001” element towards  goal “System
privacy ensured” (Figure 9).
4.4.4. Transforming Risk Treatment-related Concepts
Risk treatment-related concepts will be transformed using this set of the rules:
MCST11.  A  security  use  case  of  Misuse  case  diagram  is  transformed  to  security
constraint in Secure Tropos. This rule is  semi-automatic; user needs to define security use
case element.
Security  use  case  “Session  closes  in  15  minutes”  was translated  to  security  criterion
(Figure 9).
MCST12.  A  mitigates  relationship  from  Misuse  case  diagram  is  translated  to  the
mitigates link in Secure Tropos. Mitigates relationship can be between security constraint and
threat (see MCST7). This rule is semi-automatic; user needs to define mitigates link.
The mitigates relationship between security use case “Session closes in 15 minutes” and
misuse  case  “Check  access  eSap  repeatedly”  was  transformed  to  mitigates  relationship
between security constraint and threat “Threat-1001” (Figure 9).
4.4.5. Finalizing Transformation
To finalize model transformation from Misuse cases to Secure Tropos user have to:
1. Add missing dependency relationships between actors. Prototype do not translate
communication (association) links if system actor is depender, thus user has to do
this manually;
2. Add missing elements and relationships. Such elements as resource and softgoal
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Figure 9: Secure Tropos result model (Security Requirements view) (MCST11 and MCST12 rule
example)
are not represented in Misuse case diagrams, thus the rendering of such elements
during transformation to Secure Tropos is impossible;
3. Rename all threat elements, if it is needed. Prototype automatically names threat
elements as  “Threat-1001”,…., “Threat-(1000+N)”;  where  N is the amount of
threatens relationships in Misuse case diagram;
4.5. Summary
In this chapter we introduced the rules to transform from Secure Tropos models to Misuse
case diagrams and vice versa. The transformation rules are divided by user involvement into
transformation process to three different types: (i) automatic; (ii) semi-automatic; and (iii)
manual. Prototype uses these rules in order to perform transformation between two security
modeling  languages.  To  complete  transformation  process  user  has  to  finalize  the
transformation in both cases.
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Chapter 5: Prototype
This chapter introduces main concept of prototype, discusses it's  implementation, code
structure,  design and requirements.  Closer will  be discussed the implementation and code
structure.
5.1. Design and Requirements
The main concept of prototype is based on the interchange of the information between two
software  tools,  where  the  Misuse  case  diagrams  (MagicDraw  UML)  and  Secure  Tropos
models (SecTro2 Tool) are modeled (Figure 10). The information interchange is supported by
XML-documents,  where are  defined only Secure Tropos models.  The reason why we use
XML file format in exchanging data is very simple – the SecTro2 Tool supports model import
and export functionality using XML files, allowing us to use it as a part of the prototype.
We  can  divide  prototype  implementation  process  to  two  parts:  (i)  Misuse  case
transformation to Secure Tropos – information flow from MagicDraw UML to SecTro2 Tool;
and (ii) Secure Tropos transformation to Misuse cases – information flow from SecTro2 Tool
to MagicDraw UML.
The functional requirements for both parts of the implementation process are based on two
subjects: (i) the transformation process; and (ii) the architecture of the prototype.
5.1.1. Requirements for Misuse Case to Secure Tropos Transformation
In  this  part  we  define  the  functional  requirements  for  Misuse  case  to  Secure  Tropos
transformation process of the developed prototype.
To transform from Misuse case diagrams to Secure Tropos models we have to generate the
XML document, that can be imported to SecTro2 Tool using it's build-in functionality (Figure
10). The XML file has to be similar to original import/export files used in SecTro2 Tool. In
this case the XML document needs to contain information about already transformed Secure
Tropos model, in other words Misuse case diagram needs to be transformed right before the
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Figure 10: Main concept of the prototype
XML-document is generated. To generate XML-document we can use the Report Generation
functionality of MagicDraw UML.
According to transformation process from Misuse case diagrams to Secure Tropos models
(see 4.4) and the MagicDraw limitations over Misuse case diagrams (see 3.1.2) the part of the
Misuse  case  diagram  elements  and  relationships  (e.g.  misuse  case,  threatens)  must  be
predefined by user. Before the transformation process is started user must be able to mark
which use cases or misuse cases will be transformed to goals or plans in Secure Tropos.
The list of considered functional requirements based on the written above:
• User must be able to create or use predefined tags/stereotypes in order to differentiate
Misuse  case  additional  elements  and  relationships  from  Use  case  elements  and
relationships; 
• User must be able to mark use cases/misuse cases to transform them into goals/plans;
• User must be able to mark actors, that are depending on the system;
• Prototype must to be able to read and use user inputs;
• Prototype must transform Misuse case diagram to Secure Tropos before the generation
of the XML-document;
• Prototype  must  be  able  to  generate  XML-document  using  Report  Generation
functionality of MagicDraw;
In order to meet functional requirements, were proposed next use cases (Figure 11):
MCSTT-1 Input information;
MCSTT-2 Choose which use/misuse cases will transform to goals/plans;
MCSTT-3 Mark depender and dependee;
MCSTT-4 Generate XML file;
MCSTT-5 Use input information;
MCSTT-6 Apply transformation rules;
5.1.2. Requirements for Secure Tropos to Misuse Case Transformation
In  this  part  are  defined  functional  requirements  for  Secure  Tropos  to  Misuse  case
transformation process of the developed prototype.
To transform Secure  Tropos models  to  Misuse  case diagrams we have to  process  the
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Figure 11: Use cases for Misuse case to Secure Tropos transformation process
functional requirements
XML-document,  that  contains  information  about  Secure  Tropos  model  (Figure  10).  The
MagicDraw UML does not support this functionality, but we can use the OpenAPI of the
MagicDraw and define our own plug-in tool, that will parse the XML file.
Another major task in this transformation process is to build the Misuse case diagram
from the parsed information. Again, the OpenAPI of MagicDraw will allow us to define the
rules  of  transformation  and  will  help  us  to  build  the  Misuse  case  diagram according  to
transformation rules and parsed information.
According to transformation rules (see 4.3) the user input is not needed directly before the
transformation process begins. In our case it will be needed only after transformation process
is ended.
The list of considered functional requirements based on the written above:
• User must be able to trigger the XML file input;
• Prototype must be able to parse the XML-document;
• Prototype  must  be  able  to  build  a  Misuse  case  diagram  according  to  parsed
information;
• Prototype  must  be  able  to  create  or  use  predefined  tags/stereotypes  in  order  to
differentiate  Misuse  case  additional  elements  and  relationships  from  Use  case
elements and relationships;
• Prototype must use OpenAPI of MagicDraw UML;
In order to meet these requirements, were proposed next use cases (Figure 12):
STMCT-1 Input XML file;
STMCT-2 Parse XML file;
STMCT-3 Build Misuse case diagram;
STMCT-4 Use parsed information;
STMCT-5 Apply transformation rules;
STMCT-6 Paint Misuse case diagram elements;
5.2. Implementation
The  implementation  process  is  divided  to  two  independent  parts:  (i)  Misuse  case
transformation to Secure Tropos; and (ii) Secure Tropos transformation to Misuse cases. 
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Figure 12: Use cases for Secure Tropos to Misuse case transformation process
functional requirements
5.2.1. Transformation of Misuse Cases to Secure Tropos
To generate XML-file plug-in tool will be using the Report Generation functionality of
MagicDraw.  To use  Report  Generation  functionality  we  defined  the  XML file  template
(Figure 10), that contains logics of the transformation rules. The Report Generation is using
Apache Velocity Engine and templates are defined using Velocity Template Language. The
full user guide for Apache Velocity Template Language can be found at [Velocity]. The user
guide for Report Generation Wizard and the template management can be found at official
NoMagic web-page [Documentation] in report generation user guide.
The template  file  can  be  found in  additional  CD in  Appendix  G directory, named as
skeleton.xml.
To differentiate the Use case elements and relationships from Misuse case elements and
relationships the template file is referencing to stereotypes (see  3.1.2), that are described in
Table 1.
Table 1: Misuse case elements stereotype table
Element / Relationship Actual Element / Relationship Applied Stereotype
Misuse case Use case misuseCase
Vulnerability Use case vulnerability
Security criterion Use case secConstraint
Impact Use case impact
Security use case Use case secUseCase
Misuser Actor misuser
Constraints of Include constraints of
Threatens Include threatens
Exploits Include exploits
Leads to Include leads to
Harms Include harms
Negates Include negates
Mitigates Include mitigates
The user input is realized as template variables – goals and dependers. To mark which use
cases are going to be goals in Secure Tropos models user has to add use case identification
numbers to variable goals, joined with semicolon. To mark which actors will be dependers in
Secure Tropos models user has to add actors identification numbers to dependers variable, if
there are more than one depender, the identification numbers must be joined with semicolon.
How variables  are  used in  templates  is  shown in user  guide  of  Report  Wizard,  which  is
located at official NoMagic Inc. web-page [Documentation].
5.2.2. Transformation of Secure Tropos to Misuse Cases
To complete this part of the implementation we developed our plug-in tool, which is based
on Open API of the MagicDraw UML software. The main used technology is Java 1.7, as
OpenAPI is based on Java programming language.
The plug-in code is separated to three packages (Figure 13): (i) plugin – here are placed
all  Java  classes  that  are  directly  used by MagicDraw (e.g. action  triggers,  actions,  menu
configurators); (ii)  plugin.model – here are placed all classes that will hold the temporary
information about parsed instances of XML file (e.g. models, elements, relationships); (iii)
plugin.transformation –  here  are  placed  all  Java  classes,  that  are  used  in  transformation
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process (e.g. model builder, XML parser).
The plugin package contains four Java class files (Figure 14): ImportAction, PaintAction,
SecTroImport and  MainMenuConfigurator.  The  SecTroImport class  extends  the  OpenAPI
Plugin class – it  creates buttons in main menu; associates buttons with actions; describes
when  plug-in  is  activated  and  deactivated;  holds  MainMenuConfigurator instance.
MainMenuConfigurator describes which main menu element is changed by plug-in, in our
case it's “Tools” drop-down button in main menu of MagicDraw UML. The ImportAction and
PaintAction are triggers for menu action buttons, they describe what directly happens right
after  the  user  clicks  on  the  associated  button;  and  when  buttons  are  active  or  passive.
ImportAction class  uses  the  ModelBuilder and  Parser classes  of  plugin.transformation
package to: (i) parse the XML document; (ii) save temporary information to Model, Instance
and  Connector objects;  and  (iii)  build  Misuse  case  model.  The  action  triggers  are
implemented  in  actionPerformed methods.  The  ImportAction holds  temporary  models  in
modelsToBuild list, which are Model class objects of plugin.model package.
The  plugin.model package contains  three  Java  classes  (Figure 15):  (i)  Model –  is  the
representation of the model that was parsed from XML-document, contains lists of Instance
and  Connector objects  related  to  this  model;  (ii)  Instance objects  are  representing  the
elements that were parsed from imported XML file; (iii)  Connector objects are holding the
information about parsed relationships.
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Figure 13: Plug-in package structure
Figure 14: plugin package Java classes
The  plugin.transformation package holds four Java classes (Figure 16): (i)  Constants –
holds the constant String elements that are used by  Parser and  ModelBuilder classes;  (ii)
Parser - class, that parses the imported XML file, creates Models, Instances and Connectors,
applies some transformation rules; (iii) ModelBuilder – the actual builder of the Misuse case
diagram, applies the bigger part of the transformation rules, creates diagram view, renders
shapes  of the elements  and relationships;  (iv)  ModelBuilderUtils –  the helper-class,  holds
different methods for ModelBuilder.
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Figure 15: plugin.model package Java classes
Figure 16: plugin.transformation package Java classes
5.3. Summary
The main concept of prototype allows user to share information between two modling
softwares, where the Secure Tropos models (SecTro2) and Misuse case diagrams (MagicDraw
UML) are modeled. Prototype uses different functionalities of both modeling softwares in
order  to  complete  transformation  between two languages.  The functional  requirements  of
prototype are based on the main concept and were fully implemented. The implementation of
prototype is divided to two parts: Secure Tropos to Misuse case transformation and Misuse
case to Secure Tropos Transformation.
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Chapter 6: Validation
In this  chapter  we validate  the developed prototype.  In  order  to  check validity  of  the
prototype we conduct interview and some practical experiment.
6.1. Scope
Conducting  the  prototype  validation  we  pursue  goals  that  will  demonstrate  that  the
automated transformation process is more easier, efficient (faster) and is preferred over the
manual  transformation  process.  According to  our  goals,  the  main  scope of  the  validation
process  is  to  measure  the  efficiency  and  the  user  friendliness  aspects  of  the  developed
prototype. The main questions for validation to answer are: 
• Is  automated  transformation  process  efficient  (faster)  than  manual  transformation
process?
• Is prototype user friendly and usable?
The  chosen  methodologies  to  answer  these  questions  is  a  interview  and  a  practical
experiment.
In order  to  validate  prototype we have asked five persons,  with very low/lack  of  the
experience  in  software  modeling,  to  take  part  in  the  validation  process.  We believe  that
software modeling is social activity and people with lack of the experience in modeling will
be always involved into it. We believe that prototype could help different types of people, no
matter  how  experienced  they  are;  interviewing  these  people,  we  are  contributing  to  our
beliefs.
6.2. Validation Process
The validation process is divided to three steps:
1. Theoretical part – we briefly explain the basics of the transformation processes and
introduce both languages;
2. Practical  part  –  people  are  asked  to  transform  certain  Secure  Tropos  model  (see
Appendix D: Models for Validation) to Misuse case diagram (and vice versa) manually
(modeling on the paper), then they are asked to transform it using prototype. For each
transformation time is noted and written down. During the both processes people can
use the transformation rules;
3. Interview – people are asked to answer questionnaire questions. The example of used
questionnaire can be seen in Appendix C: Validation Questionnaire;
The questionnaire contains five questions, each question is composed in a way that while
user is answering,  he has to give the preference to one or another transformation method
(automated  or  manual),  in  a  one  to  three  scale.  The  greater  score  is,  the  greater  is  the
preference of the one transformation method over another.
6.3. Results
The results of the practical experiment can be seen in Table 2. Here are calculated mean
times  of  experiment  participants  transforming  from  one  modeling  language  to  another
manually and automatically. From the automatic process was excluded the software startup
time and included time for manual finalization of the diagrams and models (see  4.3.5 and
4.4.5). As can be seen in Table 2, the automatic transformation process is faster in both cases.
The  difference  in  time  between  manual  transformations  can  be  explained  as  follows:  in
Misuse case to Secure Tropos transformation process experiment participants transformed the
same  model  backwards  and  they  knew  what  was  the  final  answer.  This  saved  time  for
transformation. The difference in time between automated transformation processes can be
explained with the difference in amount of the work needed to finalize the transformation
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process. The automatic transformation on the average took 7 minutes for Secure Tropos to
Misuse case transformation and 11 minutes for Misuse cases to Secure Tropos transformation.
Greatest  part  of  the  time  in  automatic  transformation  process  was  occupied  by  manual
finalization of the result diagrams, whilst the application of automated rules took seconds.
Table 2: Calculated mean time (in minutes) for transformation processes
Transformation process Manual Automatic
Secure Tropos to Misuse cases 47 min 7 min
Misuse cases to Secure Tropos 38 min 11 min
The overall results of the interview can be seen in  Table 3. As the survey answers had
digital representation, we were able to calculate the mean and median for each question and
transformation process. To calculate mean and median we represented the preference scores
for manual transformation as negative score on -1 to -3 scale; and preference to automatic
transformation process as positive score on 1 to 3 scale. As can be seen, in four statements out
of five the preference was given to  automatic  transformation process.  With the following
statements we will try to analyze and give the explanations to results:
Q1:  Which  transformation  process  was  easier  to  understand?  -  Three  out  of  five
respondents have given their preference to manual transformation process in this question for
both transformation directions. Two respondents gave the biggest available score to manual
transformation process.  This  can be explained with the respondents  lack of  experience in
modeling.  While  manual  transformation  was  performed  by  applying  transformation  rules
step-by-step, the automatic transformation applies all transformation rules at once, showing
only the final result of transformation.
Q2:  Which  transformation  process  is  easier  to  learn?  -  All  respondents  gave  their
preference to automated transformation process in both transformation directions. To learn
manual transformation process participants would had to remember all rules of transformation
and  all  elements  and  relationships  of  two  languages.  To  learn  the  automated  process
participants would have to learn the algorithm of using the prototype and smaller part  of
transformation rules. Obliviously the smaller part of transformation rules would be easier to
learn.
Q3: Which transformation process is more efficient (faster) to use? - All respondents gave
the  preference  to  automated  transformation  process  for  both  transformation  directions.
Despite  the  practical  experiment  had  proven  that  the  automation  process  is  faster,  the
participants  didn't  knew  the  results  of  transformation  times,  however  in  their  subjective
opinion the automatic transformation was still faster than manual process.
Q4:  Which transformation process  was/is  easier  to remember?  -  This  question differs
from Q2 in a way that remembering would mean the availability to repeat the transformation
process second time without user manuals or transformation rules. Again, the preference was
given to automatic transformation process.  The overall  preference was given to automatic
transformation process. The explanation would be similar to explanation what was used in
Q2. The amount of things that had to be remembered is different, thus making automation
transformation process more preferable.
Q5:  Which  transformation  process  You  would  prefer  to  use  in  future?  -  The  overall
preference was given to automatic transformation process. The explanation would be very
simple – people always tend to use more convenient ways to solve problems. With automatic
transformation  process  participants  would  only  have  to  remember  smaller  part  of
transformation rules, which would be needed for finalization of models. Also the automatic
process is faster than manual process.
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Table 3: Interview overall results (ST -Secure Tropos; MUC – Misuse cases)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
ST to
MUC
MUC
to ST
ST to
MUC
MUC
to ST
ST to
MUC
MUC
to ST
ST to
MUC
MUC
to ST
ST to
MUC
MUC
to ST
Respondent 1 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
Respondent 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Respondent 3 -2 -2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Respondent 4 -3 -3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Respondent 5 -3 -3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Mean -0,6 -0,8 3 3 3 3 3 2,8 3 3
Median -2 -2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
6.4. Threats to Validity
Although the results of validation have showed that prototype is valid, there are existing
threats to validity. First, of all the amount of conducted interviews is five, which is very low.
The growth of  the  interviews  can  readjust  the  overall  picture,  and change  the  validation
results. Second, all interviewed had lack of the experience in the modeling, which could affect
on the speed of the manual transformation process, and show that automatic process is not
faster than manual transformation process. Thirdly – interview and practical experiment was
composed and conducted by developer of the prototype. The developer could use only the
stronger parts of the prototype and compose the validation in a convenient way that could
contribute to positive results of the validation.
6.5. Summary
In order to demonstrate that automated transformation process is easier, more efficient
and is  preferred  over  the  manual  transformation process  we conducted  the  interview and
practical  experiment.  The results  of  the  practical  experiment  have  shown,  that  automated
process  is  faster.  The  survey  showed  that  automated  transformation  process  is  harder  to
understand, but the preference in other statements was given to automated process, therefore
the prototype is user friendly.
Despite  the  threads  to  validity  we assume that  prototype  was  validated  correctly  and
results of the validation are correct.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
The aim of the thesis is to define the prototype tool that will automate transformation
between two security modeling languages: Secure Tropos and Misuse cases. Both security
modeling  languages  are  supported  by  different  modeling  softwares:  Secure  Tropos  by
SecTro2 tool; and Misuse cases by MagicDraw UML. The transformation between Secure
Tropos and Misuse cases is possible due to alignment of both languages to ISSRM domain
model  and  previously  defined  transformation  rules  by  [Ahmed  and  Matulevičius,  2011]
[Soomro,  2012][Ahmed  et  al.,  2012].  The  modeling  software  tools  have  limitations  and
because of that the transformation rules have to be slightly redefined.
The  developed  prototype  allows  to  transform  Secure  Tropos  models  to  Misuse  case
diagrams  and  vice  versa,  interchanging the  data  between two modeling  softwares,  where
Secure Tropos models and Misuse case diagrams are modeled. Data interchange is supported
with  XML-documents.  The  prototype  is  separated  to  two  parts,  each  part  is  developed
independently  and may  be  used  individually.  The  Secure  Tropos  to  Misuse  case
transformation part is based on OpenApi of the MagicDraw UML and is made using Java
programming language. The Misuse case to Secure Tropos transformation part is based on
Report Generation functionality of MagicDraw UML and is made using Velocity Template
technology [Velocity].
In order to demonstrate that automated transformation process is easier, more efficient
and is preferred over the manual transformation process was conducted validation process.
The  validation  showed that  automated  process  is  faster,  easier  and  more  preferable  over
manual transformation process.
7.1. Limitations
The developed prototype has several limitations. Firstly, prototype uses slightly changed
transformation  rules  due  to  limitation  of  modeling  softwares,  therefore  the  prototype
transformation  rules  can  differ  from  proposed  rules  in  [Ahmed  and  Matulevičius,  2011]
[Soomro,  2012][Ahmed  et  al.,  2012]. The  prototype  takes  in  account  only  Misuse  case
diagrams,  the  Misuse  case  templates  were  not  considered.  The  implementation  of  the
prototype can be improved with refactoring of the source code and reimplementation of the
Misuse case to Secure Tropos transformation part. The validation process involved limited
number of respondents, which may 
7.2. Conclusions
The main goal of the thesis is achieved – the prototype is completed. With our work we
raised two questions:  (i) How to manage security risks using different modeling languages
and to keep model  consistency? and (ii)  How to automate model  transformation between
Secure Tropos and Misuse cases? To answer first question we analyzed the ISSRM domain
model and transformation rules between Secure Tropos and Misuse cases. To answer second
question we developed and validated prototype.  By developing prototype we showed that
automated transformation between Secure Tropos and Misuse cases is possible. The prototype
also contributes to answering first question since it keeps the consistency of the model while
transforming from one language to another.
7.3. Future Work
The limitations are showing that there still remains future work with prototype. The work
is mostly related with improvement development. The improvement developing could solve
the  code  refactoring  problem and  redefine  transformation  rules  if  the  modeling  software
limitations will be resolved with new versions of the modeling softwares. The validation of
the prototype can be redone, now with the greater amount of respondents.
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R
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Threat agent
C
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of actor - m
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Table 7: Secure Tropos constructs in term
s of asset-related concepts of ISSRM
 (adapted from
 [M
atulevičius et al., 2012])
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Table 8: Secure Tropos risk-related constructs in term
s of ISSRM
 (adapted from
 [M
atulevičius et al., 2012])
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Threat agent
C
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A
ttack m
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C
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R
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Table 9: Secure Tropos risk-treatm
ent constructs in term
s of ISSRM
 (adapted from
 [M
atulevičius et al., 2012])
ISSR
M
 D
om
ain M
odel
(C-Construct, R-Relationship)
Secure Tropos C
onstructs
Secure Tropos C
om
ponents and Syntax
SecTro2 Tool E
xam
ple
Security requirem
ent
C
Actor, goal, resource, plan, softgoal, security
constraint.
C
ontrol
C
C
om
bination of com
ponents (on the right) and 
m
eans-end, decom
position, contribution, 
satisfies, dependency relationships.
M
itigates
R
M
itigates relationship
Im
plem
ents
R
Im
plicitly in the process of m
odeling
-
-
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Appendix B: Transformation Rules Examples
Table 10: Examples of Secure Tropos constructs transformated to Misuse case constructs
Rule ID Secure Tropos construct (before) Misuse case construct (after) Figure
Asset-related concepts
STMC1 System Actor System boundary Figure 17
STMC2 Actor Actor Figure 18
STMC3 Goal Use case Figure 19
STMC3 Plan Use case Figure 19
STMC3 Means-end and decomposition 
relationships between plans and goals
Include relationships between use cases Figure 19
STMC4 Dependency relationships between actors Communication (association) links 
between actors and associated use cases
Figure 20
STMC5 Security constraint Security criterion Figure 21
STMC5 Restricts relationship Constraints of relationship Figure 21
Risk-related concepts
STMC6 Actor Misuser Figure 22
STMC7 Goal Misuse case Figure 23
STMC7 Plan Misuse case Figure 23
STMC7 Attack method Misuse case Figure 23
STMC7 Means-end and decomposition 
relationships between plans, goals and 
attack methods
Include relationships between misuse 
cases. Communication (association) link 
between misuser and top misuse case.
Figure 23
STMC8 Vulnerability Vulnerability Figure 24
STMC8 Attacks relationship from attack method 
towards vulnerability
Exploits relationship from misuse case  
towards vulnerability, threatens 
relationship from misuse case towards use 
case
Figure 24
STMC9 Impacts relationship Construct of leads to, harms relationships 
and impact element
Figure 25
Risk treatment-related concepts
STMC10 Security constraint with mitigates 
relationship
Security use case Figure 7
STMC11 Mitigates relationship Mitigates relationship Figure 7
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Figure 17: STMC1 rule example
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Figure 18: STMC2 rule example
Figure 19: STMC3 rule example
46
Figure 20: STMC4 rule example
Figure 21: STMC5 rule example
47
Figure 22: STMC6 rule example
Figure 23: STMC7 rule example
48
Figure 24: STMC8 rule example
Figure 25: STMC9 rule example
Table 11: Examples of Misuse case constructs transformated to Secure Tropos constructs
Rule ID Misuse case construct (before) Secure Tropos construct (after) Figure
Asset-related concepts
MCST1 System boundary System actor Figure 26
MCST2 Use case Goal Figure 27
MCST2 Use case Plan Figure 27
MCST2 Include relationship Decomposition and means-end relations Figure 27
MCST3 Actor Actor Figure 28
MCST4 Security criterion Security constraint Figure 29
MCST4 Constraints of relationship Restricts relationship Figure 29
MCST5 Association relationship Dependency relationship with security 
constraint and goal
Figure 30
Risk-related concepts
MCST6 Threatens relationship Threat element Figure 31
MCST7 Misuser Actor Figure 32
MCST8 Misuse case Goal Figure 33
MCST8 Misuse case Plan Figure 33
MCST8 Misuse case Attack method Figure 33
MCST8 Include relationships Means-end and decomposition relations Figure 33
MCST9 Vulnerability Vulnerability Figure 8
MCST9 Exploits relationship Attacks relationship Figure 8
MCST10 Construct of leads to, harms relationships 
and impact element
Impacts relationship from threat towards 
goal or plan
Figure 34
Risk treatment-related concepts
MCST11 Security use case Security constraint Figure 9
MCST12 Mitigates relationship Mitigates relationship Figure 9
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Figure 26: MCST1 rule example (Security Requirements view)
50
Figure 27: MCST2 rule example (Security Requirements view)
Figure 28: MCST3 rule example (Security Requirements view)
51
Figure 29: MCST4 rule example (Security Requirements view)
Figure 30: MCST5 rule example (Security Requirements view)
52
Figure 31: MCST6 rule example (Security Requirements view)
Figure 32: MCST7 rule example (Threat “Threat-1001” sub-view)
53
Figure 34: MCST10 rule example (Security Requirements view)
Figure 33: MCST8 rule example (Threat “Threat-1001” sub-view)
Appendix C: Validation Questionnaire
In your subjective opinion, please rate the following statements in 1-3 scale, comparing
manual transformation process over automatic (place X in suitable table cell), where:
(1) Partially (Easier/Efficient/Preferable)
(2) Slightly (Easier/Efficient/Preferable)
(3) Fairly (Easier/Efficient/Preferable)
NOTE! There can be only one “X” for one row (ST to MUC; MUC to ST) (ST – Secure
Tropos; MUC – Misuse cases)
1. Which transformation process was easier to understand?
Manual Automatic
3 2 1 1 2 3
ST to MUC
MUC to ST
2. Which transformation process is easier to learn?
Manual Automatic
3 2 1 1 2 3
ST to MUC
MUC to ST
3. Which transformation process is more efficient(faster) to use?
Manual Automatic
3 2 1 1 2 3
ST to MUC
MUC to ST
4. Which transformation process was/is easier to remember?
Manual Automatic
3 2 1 1 2 3
ST to MUC
MUC to ST
5. Which transformation process You would prefer to use in future?
Manual Automatic
3 2 1 1 2 3
ST to MUC
MUC to ST
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Appendix D: Models for Validation
55
Figure 35: „Meeting scheduler“ Secure Tropos model example for validation
Figure 36: "Disclose Agreement" Threat sub-view
56
Figure 37: Misuse case diagram "Meeting scheduler" example for validation
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